The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 46

Number 1

Article 16

2-1-1979

[Book Review of] TWO VIEWS ON: Health Care Ethics, by Benedict
M. Ashley, O.P. and Kevin D. O'Rourke, O.P.
Robert Barry
Thomas J. O'Donnell

Follow this and additional works at: https://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, and the Medicine and Health Sciences
Commons

Recommended Citation
Barry, Robert and O'Donnell, Thomas J. (1979) "[Book Review of] TWO VIEWS ON: Health Care Ethics, by
Benedict M. Ashley, O.P. and Kevin D. O'Rourke, O.P.," The Linacre Quarterly: Vol. 46: No. 1, Article 16.
Available at: https://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol46/iss1/16

world is "the Holy Spirit's power to bring about an earthquake in contemporary
moral opinion." Understandable though it is, Ramsey 's position is not one that
commends itself to those who seriously hope to influence and transform society
rather than merely lament its condition or wait in fear and trembling for God to
intervene. Moreover, it is hardly the stance of one open to the genuine dialogue
proposed in the preface.
We may conclude by quoting from an earlier comment of Richard McCormick:
"In an excellent book , The Patient as Person, Ramsey's description of the duty of
caring for the dying is the most beautiful and Christian avai lable." That book , to
date, has not been improved upon and , hopefully, will continue to overshadow
this sad exercise in polemics, nit-picking, and intramural sparing. In sum , Ramsey
still has much to contribute to the ongoing debate in medical:legal ethics, but
unfortunately, not in this publication which h e promises will be his "last book in
medical ethics."
- John J . Paris, S.J.
Associate Professor of Social Ethics
Holy Cross College

TWO VIEWS ON:

Health Care Ethics
Benedict M. Ashley, O.P. and Kevin D. O'Rourke, O.P.
Catholic Hospital Association, 1438 Grand Blvd. , St. Louis, Mo. 63104, 1978. xii
+ 507 pp, $13.00, soft cover.
Christian medical practitioners and health care profess ionals sta nd to benefit
greatly from this careful and comprehensive study of current m edical-moral and
bioethical problems written by Fathers Ashley and O'Rourke. Father O ' RoUl'ke is
the present medical·moral advisor for the Catholic Hospital Association. Father
Ashley is a professor of moral theology at Aquinas Institute, and was recently
granted the prestigious Master of Sacred Theology degree from the Dominican
Order. Both authors are highly skilled theologians, as well as philosoph ers and
moralists , who have combined their substantial skills to create this comprehensive ,
well organized and well-written study of moral problems in current health care.
This study thoroughly investigates philosophical, theological and moral aspects of
bioethical reasoning, abortion, contraception, triage, psychotherapy and pastoral
care. The primary value of the wOl'k is that it integrates the latest and most
advanced theological and philosophical d evelopm e nts with moral analyses of problems in these areas. While it is often difficu lt to distinguish the work of many
moral theologians from that of bioethicists and medical moralists , the distinctive
theological character of this work is quite evident. This work is clearly a work of
moral theology , and it is wl'itten for the ex plicit purpose of providing guidelines
for Christian health care .
Of significant value in this work is the notion of human totality and integrity,
for this principle mak es it possibl e to deduce the grounds for the c laim of human
persons to an a bsolute and unconditional right to life. The integrity of the human
person rests upon a capacity for integrating ordel's of mean ing, logic and value for
the purposes of generating richer and more complex orders. The class of pel·sons is
the only class possessing this active capability of synth es is and integration for that
purpose. This enables persons to actualize meanings a nd values that are morally
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protected from positive acts of destruction. The rightful ex istence of these orders
warrants the absolute a nd unconditional right of this class of agents to exist,
regardless of the degree of integration accomplished. This I·ight must exist because
it necessarily presupposes the unconditionally rightful ex istence of the richer and
higher orders of value an d meaning actuali zed by the class of persons.
Ashley and O ' Rourke's work, howeve r , is not without its flaw s. The critical
problem of the cond itions required for the valid id e ntifica tion of the point of
actua lization of the hum an person is not sufficiently treated. This is because the
definition of the hum an person offered is imprecise. The human pe rson is defined
as "embodied inte llige nt fr ee dom " (pp. 10-12) and no spec ific funct ions or operat ions of th e person are included in this definition that would permit facile
id e ntification. It is not log ica lly possib le to id entify cl ea rly any specific functions
entai led by this d efi ni t ion that would mark the point at which the person actualizes and terminates. For it is no t analyt ic that perso nhood actuali zes or terminates
when freedom or inte lligence actualize in an e mbodi ed form; indeed, personhood
may exist pl·ior to man 's fully developed physical being, or ex ist after its extinction. The person is not the embod ime nt of these states, but is the causal subject to
which these states, in their actuali zation and termination, are ascr ibed . The person
is actualized when this causal subject comes to be , and can terminate only when it
ceases to be. If t he person were id e ntified with embodi ed intelligent freedom,
then t h e termination of these states would entai l the termination of the person ,
and th is is ev id ently not tl· ue. The person must be id e ntifi ed as the ca usa l agent of
these states.
Questio ns a lso can be raised about the logical adequacy of the defini tion of
natural law olTered by Ashley and O'Rourke. They contend that natural law
prohib itions and prescr iptions are grounded on genel·ali zat ions made from human
exper ienc e (p. 167). This does not re rJect the logica l foundations of the natural
law , because genera lizations from t h e opinions of a com munity conce rning th e
moral quality of acts do not e ntail the validity of these judgments. Acts are
prohibited by natural law, not because of the general experience of humanity , but
because the exercise of these acts necessarily entails th e actualization of morally
prohibited states of affail·s. Acts are immoral because the causal chain actuali zed
by them prohibits the highest o l·d ers of value to b e achieved.
Finally, the discussion of the moral p ermiss ibility of arti fici a l contrace ption is
clear and concise, but also not without its faults. Ashley and O'Rourke suggest
that marital acts performed during sterile pel·iods are indil-ectly a nd re motely
OI·dered to procreat ion , while acts of artificial contl·aception are directly and
proximately conll·ary to procreation (p. 274). This is doubtful, for a close exam in ation of the necessa ry e ntailm e nts of both of these acts revea ls th e m to be id entical in the procreative co nditions they entail. It is not logically or practically
possi bl e for acts of e ith er type to be directly or indirec tly, proximately or
remotely, ordered to procreation. Infe rtility is necessar ily e ntailed in the performance of both types, and conception is not a foreseen but unintended consequence of e it h er type of act. If a relation of indirection and re mote ness existed
be tween ster il e m ar ita l acts and procreation , then the intervention of external
causal chains would permit these acts to remain unchanged in their logical structure whi le causing conception. But that is not the case. AI-tificially contraceptive
acts cannot be condemned because they entail directly a nd proximately infertile
marita l acts, for sterile marita l acts entai l the same states of affairs. Alternate
ground s for prohibiting these acts must be found.
These are not to be considered as fata l flaws. Healt h Care Ethics remains an
extre m ely val uabl e work in the fi e ld that should be in the library of all concerned
with establishing C hl·i st ian h ea lth care.
- Rev. Robert Barry, O.P.
Providence College
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Heall h Carl' E thics, a new text by Benedict Ash ley , O.P. (professor of moral
at t h e Aquin as In st itute in Dubuqu e) a nd Kevin O'Rourke , O.P. (vice
pres id e nt of t he Cat ho li c Ho spital Assoc iat io n ) has bee n recently publi shed. It is a
notab le addition to t h e fi e ld of m edi ca l' mora l li terature in its sco pe, d eta il , and
cl a ri ty o f prese ntati o n . The a ut hors fr a nkl y admit t h at t h ey propose a Chri st ia n
and R o m an Cath o li c set of va lu es and point o ut that: "Ca tholics reaso n ethica ll y
in te ml S of a val u e system rooted in a view o f rea li ty given by the Christ ian gospe l,
inter preted by the C h urch in its life of faith , a nd auth or itatively formul ated by
the Pope a nd t he Bi shops." They go o n to observe that Catholics accelJ t such
teac hing w it h re li gio us asse n t, eve n wh e n this lacks t h e fin a l authority o f a so le mn
d e fini t io n . Th ey state, however , that this is not m eant to ex clud e an ecum f> nica l
assessm e nt of oth e r va lu e syste ms, by w hi ch they hop e to ac hieve "a n openness to
th e opt ions of othe rs a nd a deep e n ing of our own Ch rist ia n and Catho li c id e nt ity." And w hil e th is assessment is ve ry well done in their text, their evaluat ion of
anot he r rece n t type o f pluralism , w hich claims to re m a in w ithin the p aram ete rs of
Catho li c teac hing, see m s to be a bit less percept ive and perhaps too benig n .
But be fore comm e nt in g furth e r on that, it sh o uld b e st ressed that theil' treatm ent of th e basic dete l'm inants of m ora lity is both espec ia lly good a nd pal,tic ularl y nee d e d at t h is tim e when a certa in basic co n fu sio n has becl o ud ed t hi s
qu est ion. Because these " determin an ts of morality" are part of t h e trad e language
of et hi cs a nd moral th eo logy a nd beca use certai n modifi cat io ns of their accepte d
m ea ning is the poin t of d e pal'ture for much of t h e confusion we see today, so m e
deta il ed com m ent on t h em may prove h elp fu l to those in terested in the m ed icalm oral field .
Th e " detel'minants of morality, " co mmonl y I'e fe rred to as m ora l object,
m o tive, and circumstances are lab els to id e ntify what is t l'u e of any hum a n action:
that so m et hing is done, for so m e reaso n (o r reasons), in so m e concrete c ircum,
sta nces. By moral o bjec t (w hat is done ) is not m ea nt just a ph ysical action , but
rathel' a phy sical act ion t hat is suffi cie n t ly d ete rmin ed as to h ave a n identity in
the moral orde r. Thu s, for exampl e , "langu age regarding God" merely d escribes a
phys ica l act ion which , as a moral objec t , co uld b e e ith e r p rayer , in o n e case, 01'
blas ph e my in anoth e r. Lik e wise "ca m al in tercourse" is a physical act io n an d ,
con side red on ly as a physical action withou t any furth er dete rminati o n has no
sp ecific identification in t he mo ral order. But carn al inte rcourse betwee n the
unmalTi ed is d esc rib ed by t he mo ral term "fornication" (a moral object). Thus t h e
word s "b lasph e my " or "fomication " descr ib e not m erely a phy sical action, but
rat he r ar id ent ifi a bl e mOl'al o bject - i.e. , a physical action w it h a n intentionali ty
or a for mali ty t hat d e t ermines t he act itself, as id e for a n y m otive for wh ich it is
done.
Perhaps t his co n cept can be somew h at c larified by a bri e f reflection on how
philosophe rs tal k about t h e finality (a nd formality) o f things as we ll as actio ns. A
t hing can have two distinct purposes, one of which is built into it (call ed th e finis
operis, or the purpose of t he thing itself) a nd this may be d if fe re nt from t h e
purpose of the individual w h o uses it (ca ll ed the fInis operantis, or th e purp ose of
the age nt) . For exa mpl e, a clock is a co llocat ion of m etal an d pl astic p a l'ts co nstructed into a fun ct ional configuration designed 10 indicate the correct tim e.
Th at is t he fInis operis o r th e clock. If so m eo ne uses the c lo c k as a h amm er, to tap
a thumbtack into a wall , t h e purpose of t h e agent in such a case (finis operantis)
diffe rs from the finis operis of the clock ( i.e., what t h e cloc k is in itse lf and what
it is des igned to do ). Nonetheless it sti ll remai ns a clock , albe it now b ei n g used as
a h amm e r. In such a case we migh t say th at its mat eriali ty is metal and pl ast ic , its
formalit y is clock, and that the moti ve or purpose fOl' w hich one uses it is not
necessar il y identical with its own internal formality (or built-in intentiona li ty).
Since an action is lik e wise a t hing, as w e conve l' t t h ese te l'm s to the m o ral order
it is impol'tant to note t h at the " reaso n wh y" or t h e "moti ve for which " somet h eo l o~y
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body does something (the finis operantis) is not necessarily sufficient to ex plain
the finality (finis operis) or formality of the action itself. An action may have its
own finality , in the moral order, which is quite distinct from the motive for which
one does it .
Thus we could say that carnal intercourse , considered only as a physical action,
is a materiality (an action, considered only in itself, without moral reference or
specification). Wh e n, how ever, it is extra-marital interco urse (fornication or adultery) it is now said to have a finis operis, which is to say that its physical materiality has become a moral formality , no matter who does it, or when , or where, or
why. Thus a purely phy sical action (such as language regarding God or carnal
intercourse) can acquire an intentionality or formality (blasphemy or fornication)
which is distinct from the motive for which it is done in a particular set of
circumstances. Such would be referred to as a seriously wrong moral object (finis
operis - "intrinsically evil" which cannot become good even if done for a good
motive or under supposedly mitigating circumstances.
During the 1970 's, h oweve r , there has been a revisionist movement among
some Catholic moral theologians both in Europe and in th e United States which
seems to discredit any id ea of an intrinsically evil moral object, and seeks to
dete rmine the morality of an action only by a simultaneous consid e ration of the
physical action itself (devoid of any intentiona lity [moral formality 1 or finis
operis) together with the finis operantis(the motive for which it is done) and the
other circumstances of the act . Joseph Fuchs was one of the prim e innovators of
this revisionist movement and, as Ashley and O 'Rourke point out in Health Care
Ethics, "Fuchs' position implies that no act considered in its intrinsic nature
solely according to its moral object can be judged ' intrinsically evil' (malum per
se). Hence h e (Fuchs) logically concludes, we must abandon the classical notion of
'a bsolute moral norms' since all moral rules may admit of exception given some
special combination of object, circumstance and intention" (p. 189). Ashley and
O ' Rourke, of course, do not agree with this revisionist error, nor do the majority
of Catholic moral theologians, nor ind eed (it is interesting to note), did Fuchs
himse lf, priOl· to the publication of Humanae Vitae (cf. J . Fuchs , Th eo logia
Moralis Generalis, Rome : Gregorian University Press, 1966 / 67). The error of this
revisionist movement can perhaps bes t be appreciated in its "bottom line ,"
reach e d last year in a book by Anthony Kosnik et al. where one finds a proposed
defense for such actions as fornication , adultery, homosexuality , cont,·aception,
etc. as able to be morally acceptable if done for proper motives a nd under sufficientl y fulfilling or demanding circumstances (A. Kosnik et al., Human Sexuality, New York: Paulist Press , 1977). This can scarcely be called Catholic moral
teaching.
Whil e it is true that Ashley and O'Rourk e thus propose solidly Catho lic principles in Health Care Ethics, they seem to weaken somewhat in their treatment of
the controversial subject of contraception. A lthough faithfully staying within the
doctrinal limits of the encyclicals CasU Connubii and Humanae Vitae, they state
that: " it is clear that these documents do not claim to give a definitive decision
about a revea led truth of faith or morals, which is all that the first Vatican
Council declared to be an object of infallibility, a d eclaration confirmed by the
second Vatican Council" (p. 270). Th at statement , as it stands, is simply too
compressed to be a complete or even adequate statement regarding the force of
t he Church 's teaching on contraception. Nor is it enough to say , as they do, that
there may be rev ea led truths in some e ncyclicals which "may later be solemnly
defined" (ibidem). There is not adequate development of the teaching of Vatican
II that a d e fide d efin ition by a Pope , or even by a Council, is not the only source
of infallibl e teaching. Vatican II states that: "Although the individual bishops do
not enjoy the prerogative of infallibility, they can neverth eless proclaim Christ's
doctrine infallibly . This is so , even when they are dispersed throughout the world ,
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provided that while maintaining the bond of unity among themselves and with
Peter's successor, and while teaching authentically on a matter of faith or morals,
they concur in a single viewpoint as the one which must be held conclusively"
(Lumen Gentium, no.25). To appreciate the profound significance of that teaching, with regard to the Church's teaching on contraception, one might consult the
long and scholarly article recently published by John Ford and Germain Grisez
(Theological Studies, 39:2 , June 1978, pp. 258-312). The final conclusion of
these two eminent scholars is: "We think there is an extremely strong case for the
position that the received Catholic teaching on the immorality of contraception
has been infallibly proposed by the ordinary magisterium" (i.e., by the long
standing teaching of the bishops in union with the Roman Pontiff as described
above).
All of this clearly demonstrates that the teaching of the Church on contraception is, even if not certainly infallible, certainly more than just encyclical teaching
and certainly less open to the facile dissent of some theologians which, as the
Holy See has recently pointed out: " cannot be considered as a 'theological source'
which the faithful might invoke and thereby abandon the authentic magisterium
and follow the opinions of private theologians which dissent from it" (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith , Prot. 2027 / 69 , March 13, 1975). Ashley and
O 'Rourke have made a genuine effort to soften the edges of the controversy over
contraception and blend the various elements of dissent into a ,·easonable synthesis with the teaching of the Church , but the result is more of a compromise
than a commentary; and fails to ,·eflect the unambiguous teaching of the Church
in this regard.
- Rev. Thomas J. O'Donnell, S.J .
Seminary of St. Pius X
(Reprinted with permission of Ayd Medical Communications.)
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